Commentary
Philosophy in prison

mm.mccabe@kcl.ac.uk
Abstract
The UK prison system is in crisis: overcrowded, understaffed, ill fitted to whatever purpose imprisonment might be intended to have. Prison education is particularly under pressure, especially since a majority of prisoners are functionally illiterate. The charity Philosophy in Prison seeks to address the complex problems of prison education by offering philosophical conversations in prisons: oral, so accessible to most, but driven by difficult philosophical questions that are puzzling to anyone. This process faces down the disadvantage suffered by many within the criminal justice system, that their voices are not heard (the problem of epistemic injustice). For these conversations have an equalising effect, since the problems they address are puzzling to anyone, whether new to it or expert. That general puzzlement allows the participant both to see the viewpoints of others, and to have their own viewpoint seen by others. This matters: it shows each prisoner that they do have standing, in themselves, after all. (This article is published in the thematic collection ‘The arts and humanities: rethinking value for today—views from Fellows of the British Academy’, edited by Isobel Armstrong.)
Keywords
UK prison systemprison educationphilosophy in Prisonphilosophical conversationepistemic injusticeequalising effectCopyright statement © The author(s) 2024. This is an open access article licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International License
Cite this article McCabe, M.M. (2024), ‘Philosophy in prison’, Journal of the British Academy, 12(3): a41 https://doi.org/10.5871/jba/012.a41

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Although informed consent is rooted in the growing affirmation of the subject’s autonomy, medical anthropology has highlighted the inherent limits of this procedural notion. My ethnographic research in neurological and geriatric clinics between France and Italy showed the triangular (dis)trust relationship—between older people with Alzheimer’s disease (AD), their doctor, and their caregiver. Following their cognitive decline and loss of autonomy, people with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) could be victims of epistemic injustice in two specific moments of the illness: the diagnostic disclosure and the institution of legal protection. If the diagnostic information diminishes the patient’s credibility, the institution of legal protection undermines the patient’s social identity and legal status. However, when caregivers preserve an unconditional trust in the permanence of the patient’s subjective identity, this trust may be conveyed to clinical teams, significantly improving the therapeutic relationship, the course of the disease, and the quality of life for all the actors involved.

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