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Thematic Article
The evolution of Greenlandic security and defence policy: a quest for recognition
Rasmus Leander Nielsen*†
,
raln@uni.gl
Jeppe Strandsbjerg‡
Abstract
This article traces the recent development of security and defence policy in Greenland. Although constitutionally, questions of security and defence have been for Denmark to decide, Greenland has recently begun to formulate its own security and defence policies, as part of its quest to secure international recognition as an actor in its own right, and to play a part in shaping, and benefitting from, vast increases in defence investments. Traditionally, Greenland has cleaved to a pacifist position, and has sought to keep the military presence in the Arctic to a minimum. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the threat of annexation following President Trump’s return to the White House, have raised the stakes over matters of Arctic security. As Greenland has demanded a greater say in negotiations with the Danish government over investments in security, defence policy has come to the fore in the domestic politics of Greenland itself. This article is published in the Thematic Collection ‘On Greenland’, edited by Tim Ingold.
Keywords
defenceforeign policymilitarisationpacifismrecognitionsecurityIntroduction
In February 2024, Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat) published a strategy for foreign, security, and defence policy (Government of Greenland 2024), which was a significant update of a foreign policy strategy from 2011 and was intended to guide Greenland’s foreign relations and international political economy until 2033 (Nielsen & Strandsbjerg 2024). Only a few years later, however, the strategy already appears somewhat outdated. The Trump-ordeal and the return of great power rivalry to the Arctic clashes with the slow-motion evolution of Greenlandic agency in regional and international relations. The strategy feeds into an evolution of Greenlandic foreign affairs developed over more than half a century, which in recent years has seen an increasing emphasis on security and defence policy (Nielsen & Strandsbjerg 2024; Olsvig & Charron 2026).
Three oft-cited slogans sum up much of contemporary Greenlandic foreign policy. The first was introduced in 2019, in an elegantly worded tweet: ‘Open for business – not for sale’. The second is ‘Nothing about us without us’, which is the subtitle of the 2024 strategy. The third, which emerged in the spring of 2025, asserts ‘We do not want to be Americans, we do not want to be Danes, we want to be Greenlanders’ (Nielsen 2025).1
These slogans are motivated, at least in part, by a quest for equality and the right to self-determination, as well as postcolonial recognition. At first glance, the fact that the 2024 strategy covered foreign, security, and defence policy may seem odd. As a self-governing polity within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland does not have formal, de jure, authority to conduct its own security and defence (Strandsbjerg 2025). However, de facto, Greenland is developing foreign policies and relations. An integral part of Greenland’s struggle for self-determination has been to be recognised not only as an equal partner, but also as an entity distinct from Denmark (Jacobsen & Gad 2018). In a foreign policy context, this means seeking recognition from other countries as an actor in its own right, and not merely as an appendage of Denmark. Greenland’s aim has been to define its own vision for the Arctic and to play a greater role in it. Yet at the same time, in its insistence on conducting its own foreign policy despite having no defence forces of its own, Greenland can be seen to act like a state, bringing enhanced recognition from other nations. Moreover, the growing international interest from the outside world, and the recognition that comes from it, only goes to strengthen Greenland’s negotiating position, particularly vis-à-vis Denmark.
In this article, we trace the evolution of security and defence policy in Greenland, highlighting the quest for recognition as a driving force which is currently being calibrated in a geopolitically complicated Arctic. We begin by examining the background of Greenlandic agency in foreign affairs, before turning our attention to defence and security policy, especially since 2021.
Foreign policy agency
Article 19 of the 1953 Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark stipulates that foreign, security, and defence policies are prerogatives of Denmark proper. In practice, however, developments have moved well beyond a narrow interpretation of the Constitution’s provisions, which state that the King—or in effect, the Danish Government—acts on behalf of the realm. Recently, with the intensification of great power competition in the Arctic, Greenland has formulated its own defence policies, even though it has no armed forces to implement them (Strandsbjerg 2025).
Historically, foreign policy was conducted from Copenhagen—often under the influence of the USA—without much involvement from Greenland. A critical juncture in the development of Greenland’s agency in foreign policy came in the early 1970s, with opposition to the EEC, and gained further momentum by withdrawal from the EEC in 1985 (Nielsen & Strandsbjerg 2024). In the 1990s, Greenland played an important role in establishing the Arctic Council. And around the turn of the millennium, there were further developments, both with the so-called Anorak Report (1999), which set out the extent of Greenland’s evolving agency, and in connection with US plans to upgrade facilities at Thule Air Base (now Pituffik Space Base). This process culminated in the Itilleq Declaration of 2003, which states that both Greenland and Denmark must participate in meetings where security issues relating to Greenland are at stake, and the Igaliku Agreement of 2004, under which Greenland became a co-signatory to an agreement on Arctic and North Atlantic defence with the US. In 2005, an Authorisation Act granted Greenland the right to enter into international agreements on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark, which was further elaborated in the Act on Greenland Self-Government of 2009 (Kingdom of Denmark 2009; Strandsbjerg 2025).
Over the years, Greenland has thus incrementally identified its own vision for the Arctic and the role it wishes to play within it. This must be seen in the light of a colonial history in which Greenland has often been viewed, analysed, and described from the outside as an asset. That is why it has been so important for Greenland to develop its own vision and define its role in the Arctic before others do, and to take part in negotiations and deliberations concerning the Arctic, as epitomised in the slogan ‘nothing about us without us’. But beyond the desire to define its own path between the great powers and the former colonial power, foreign policy provides Greenland with an arena to pursue greater autonomy and recognition, and to diversify and strengthen its global presence (Jacobsen & Gad 2018; Nielsen & Strandsbjerg 2024).
Agency, here, lies both in the substance of foreign policy and in recognition, internationally and within the Kingdom of Denmark, as an equal actor. This situation has sometimes made foreign policy a conflict-ridden policy area. Yet, since the Trump-ordeal resurfaced in 2025, there have been moves towards greater harmony and collaboration, which now include security and defence policies and investments. The 2024 strategy was particularly focused on strengthening ties and cooperation with North America, whereas the EU was given relatively low priority. This is surprising, given how important, at least economically, cooperation with the EU has been for many years (Nielsen & Strandsbjerg 2024). Recent discussions around rewriting parts of the strategy indicate that this is likely to change, toning down the focus on the US and raising the EU up a notch (Nielsen 2025).
Greenland has repeatedly emphasised that it is Denmark’s key to the Arctic. This was reflected in the beginning of this decade in the insistence that the Kingdom could not agree on a new common Arctic strategy, when the previous strategy expired in 2020. Greenland wanted to formulate its own first. Furthermore, Greenland won a battle for the right to appoint a Greenlander as the Kingdom’s Arctic ambassador. Since 2025 this position has been held by Kenneth Høegh, who represents the Kingdom of Denmark in meetings of senior Arctic officials and in the numerous diplomatic fora related to the Arctic (Nielsen 2025; Strandsbjerg 2025). Behind these developments, however, the Danish Constitution is still often viewed as a straitjacket that restricts Greenland’s efforts to act independently on the international stage. As Permanent Secretary Mininnguaq Kleist argued in 2022, at a business conference in Nuuk:
We are pushing the boundaries of the Constitution. That is how we make progress. I am not creating a crisis within the Realm. I am driving development together with my colleagues. …The Constitution lays the foundation for the Danish Realm. But can I challenge it? Yes, I can. Because it does not lay out every detail. My job is to push things forward in the interests of the Greenlandic people. (quoted in Strandsbjerg 2025).
Defence policy in the making
In 2021, the Greenlandic Government rejected the so-called Arctic Capacity Package, which would have promised substantial Danish investments in Arctic surveillance capability. Since then, defence policy has become a more salient issue, as well as a source of considerable controversy both between Denmark and Greenland and within Greenland itself, where it is emerging as a contentious domestic policy issue. The formulation of a defence and security policy in the 2024 strategy was thus eagerly awaited (Nielsen & Strandsbjerg 2024). The section of the strategy document on Security and Defence Policy includes a range of both major and minor initiatives, including a stress on Greenland’s participation in the Western alliance and the posting of a Greenlandic diplomat to NATO. Recently, there has been a more tangible emphasis on Greenland’s openness to investments in surveillance and deterrence.
In the years prior to this, Greenland had maintained a pacifist approach to military presence and Arctic security. In 2021, the political parties Inuit Ataqatigiit and Naleraq formed a coalition government, premised on their agreement that Greenland should avoid militarisation (Strandsbjerg 2025). The rationale behind this traditional Greenlandic position was always that the absence of the military is the best recipe for peace. This attitude to security is an extension of both the political mobilisation in the 1970s and especially the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s (ICC) approach to a peaceful Arctic. The conventional view has long been to keep any military presence—since it primarily concerns the security of others, namely the US and Denmark—to a minimum. Given however, that the presence of the US military was seen as obligatory, having been cemented by the Defense Agreement of 1951, the pragmatic response was to make the most of it. Greenland’s strategic interests have thus centred on three aims: (1) to derive economic benefit from the American and Danish military presence; (2) to keep military installations far away from the population, thus protecting them from becoming targets in any potential conflict; (3) to seek recognition as a legitimate actor in the field of security policy. The first has traditionally been dominant, the second still causes heated domestic debates, while the third has become more prominent in recent years.
The recognition process within the defence relationship has been protracted and rather turbulent. To keep the story short, we will primarily focus on recent years. In February 2021, the Ministry of Defence launched the Arctic Capacity Package, intended to address concerns about a lack of surveillance capabilities, and promising substantial investments. However, in line with the principle of ‘nothing about us without us’, and the coalition agreement mentioned above, the Package was rejected, partly on the grounds of the lack of Greenlandic involvement in the decision-making process. With the Package on hold, lengthy negotiations began in which Greenlandic diplomats were repeatedly involved. In this, the Danish Government recognised Greenland’s right to say no, or at least to ‘filibuster’ through delays, even though Greenland has no formal powers in this regard (Nielsen & Strandsbjerg 2024). This bolstered the recognition of Greenland as a more equal partner in negotiations over defence investments, while simultaneously shifting Greenlandic preferences towards a position more open to deterrence and increased military presence. Following the initial rejection of the Capacity Package, a process continued until the summer of 2022 to determine the principles for implementing it. This resulted in an agreement, which ensures both a focus on military investments benefiting Greenland and the involvement of Greenland in negotiations regarding major defence investments and developments.
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there was very clear support from Greenland for Western sanctions. At the same time, attitudes towards military presence were altering, as expressed in February 2023 by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vivian Motzfeldt, in the local newspaper Sermitsiaq: ‘So yes, Greenland must be prepared to make further land available for military activities’ (quoted in Strandsbjerg 2025). This gradual shift in rhetorical positioning was reflected once again in the 2024 strategy, in which Greenland expressed a desire to take on more responsibility through closer cooperation with the Joint Arctic Command and for greater involvement in general in matters of defence and security. This increased engagement was launched under the maxim ‘we must not be naïve’, suggesting that the desire to keep tensions low is tempered by an acknowledgement that the situation in Ukraine, along with broader geopolitical concerns, calls for action in the defence sector.
Recent developments in geopolitics and defence policy
President Trump’s return to the White House, with his ambitions of annexing Greenland, has led to a sharpening of the rhetoric (Nielsen 2025; Olsvig & Charron 2026). This has altered political priorities in Greenlandic foreign policy, even if many of the core principles remain unchanged. The biggest change is probably that Greenland’s appetite for cooperation with North America has diminished. However, this is primarily directed at the Trump administration. Relations with Canada remain warm, with the opening of a new Canadian consulate in Nuuk, and the desire to reinforce ties between Inuit communities across the Arctic remains strong. At the same time, there is greater potential—and a warmer reception—for European cooperation, especially with the EU and NATO allies such as Germany and France (Strandsbjerg 2025). Naalakkersuisut (the Government of Greenland) participated in the Munich Security Conferences of 2025 and 2026. Informal and unofficial conversations among non-governmental actors—otherwise known as ‘track two diplomacy’—remain a priority. Discussions and meetings at international conferences no longer focus only on trade, fishing, and whaling, and participation in international fora, but have gained an added security dimension.
As an outcome of the agreement of 2022 on how to implement the Arctic Capacity Package, Greenland became involved in the budget negotiations for the Danish Defence Budget Act 2024–2033 (Government of Denmark 2024). This led to very close cooperation at the civil servant level and meetings at the ministerial level. Compared to the previous lack of Greenlandic involvement, which had caused the Package to be rejected in the previous year, this appears to be a success story—the fruit of genuine dialogue and negotiation between Copenhagen and Nuuk. The outcome so far has been two part-agreements on the Arctic and the North Atlantic under the 2024–33 defence agreement, announcing substantial new acquisitions for surveillance and presence including drones, radar systems, surveillance planes, and new Arctic patrol vessels (Forsvarsministeriet 2025a, 2025b). But in addition to the new equipment and replacements, the agreements also reveal a clear Greenlandic influence. It was agreed, for example, to explore the possibility of establishing so-called Greenlandic Rangers, modelled on the Canadian Rangers. Furthermore, it is stated that Greenland’s symbols and language will be made visible through signage on Defence Force buildings and similar structures in Greenland (Strandsbjerg 2025). This reflects a desire to enhance the Greenlandic identity of that section of the Defence Force operating in Greenland.
However, these developments involve a balancing act, between aligning to the demands of allies and continued adherence to the traditional pacifist line. By becoming more like a state and investing in defence—partly in order to take the sting out of recent US rhetoric—controversies over militarisation shift from being mainly between Denmark and Greenland to the arena of Greenlandic domestic politics (Strandsbjerg 2025). Currently, there is no consensus regarding Greenland’s future alliances. Nevertheless, some politicians have stated that they want to revisit the 2024 strategy—a position reiterated by both senior diplomats and several ministers. For example, Pipaluk Lynge, the chair of the Inatsisartut (Parliament of Greenland) Foreign and Security Policy Committee, told the local media outlet KNR: ‘The world has changed, and the future is unpredictable. That is why I believe that we must revise our foreign policy strategy’ (quoted in Nielsen 2025).
With the Trump-induced explosion of attention towards Greenland, the stance on security and defence issues is being revisited. In 2026, then Foreign Minister Motzfeldt declared that ‘we do not want an arms race in the Arctic. But we also do not want a power vacuum in the Arctic. We do not seek militarization as an end in itself. But we also do not accept that the power politics of others should define our future’ (quoted in Sermitsiaq 2026). As we have shown, ambitions and agency in relation to defence policy have grown considerably in recent years. Yet, the rapid shifts in Arctic security politics, and especially the threats from Trump, challenge the traditionally slow-paced evolution of Greenland’s foreign affairs, which are currently being recalibrated in the intersection of geopolitics, decolonisation, and the still-evolving quest for recognition.
CRediT roles
Rasmus Leander Nielsen: Writing – Original Draft, Writing – Review & Editing.Jeppe Strandsbjerg: Writing – Original Draft, Writing – Review & Editing.
Declaration of conflict of interest
The authors declare no potential conflict of interest.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research and authorship of this article.
AI disclosure
The authors declare that no AI was used in the preparation of this work.
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1
Common statement signed by all party leaders 9 January 2026 (https://naalakkersuisut.gl/Nyheder/2026/01/0901_staar-sammen?sc_lang=da). There are several quotes in this article, many of them translated from Danish, which again have been translated from Greenlandic. All quotes from Danish are our translation.
Cite
DOI: 10.5871/jba/014.a32
Published on: 25 September 2026
Volume: 14
Issue: Issue 3
Article view count: 2
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© The author(s) 2026. This is an open access article licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International LicenseCite this article
Nielsen, R. L. & Strandsbjerg, J. (2026), ‘The evolution of Greenlandic security and defence policy: a quest for recognition’, Journal of the British Academy, 14(3): a32 https://doi.org/10.5871/jba/014.a32Crossref
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Received
October 2022
Accepted
May 2023
Published
July 2023
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