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Thematic Article
Economic deterrence versus economic viability of Ukraine during the time of Russia’s full-scale invasion: risks and opportunities
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Abstract
Economic security, particularly economic viability, is a critical pillar of national security, underpinning a state’s sovereignty, stability, and long-term prosperity. While standard economic theories and textbooks typically address economic dynamics under conditions of peace, far less attention has been paid to how economies operate during and after periods of armed conflict, despite the increasing frequency of such events worldwide in recent years. The Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not only severely undermined Ukraine’s economic security but has also contributed to broader global repercussion, including economic slowdowns, substantial financial losses, heightened inflation, rising debt burdens, and increased poverty levels in various parts of the world. This article seeks to address this analytical gap by examining the state of economic security in Ukraine amid wartime conditions, with particular emphasis on economic viability, business impacts, associated risks, and emergent opportunities. Using a ‘5D’ approach together with the ‘strategic trilemma’, the Ukrainian case offers insights for international investors contemplating engagement in conflict-affected environments and provides a foundational basis for further scholarly inquiry into the relationship between war and economic resilience. This article is published in the Thematic Collection ‘Researchers at Risk: the view from Ukrainians in the UK’.
Keywords
economic securityeconomic viabilitystrategic trilemmariskopportunityUkrainefull-scale invasionIntroduction
The changing dynamics in the global order, marked by the re-emergence of competition between great powers and the evolving priorities of major actors, will affect the strategic priorities and choices of Ukraine. As of 2025, for many US allies, the American security umbrella is no longer serving as a mainstay of national defence and geopolitical stability. The recent rhetoric from President Donald Trump has generated profound unease, particularly among states that perceive existential threats from revisionist powers such as Russia and China (Davlikanova & Vdovychenko 2025). This marks a potentially transformative shift in global security architecture, requiring a new look at the issues of economic security as well as economic viability of countries either experiencing war-related effects or being directly attacked either kinetically (using direct physical force) or in a hybrid manner, trying to provide efficient economic sanctions and suffering sabotage campaigns or cyberattacks in response (Drezner 2024; Vdovychenko & Khutor 2025).
The methodological approach employed in this article combines theories from strategic studies and international economics. An early definition of international economic security at the end of the 20th century emphasised a narrowly defined scope centred on the intersection of trade, investment, and national defence (Cable 1995). In particular, it referred to those dimensions of economic activity that directly influence a state’s capacity to ensure its own defence, such as the unrestricted acquisition of weapons, war-related technology, the security and liability of supply chains, etc. Moreover, we use the concept of ‘deterrence’ from strategic studies that re-emerged in international economic studies, especially after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Sörenson 2024).
Deterrence should be framed as the strategic use of threats, particularly those involving the application or projection of military force, to prevent actors in the international system from engaging in actions deemed harmful or destabilising (Freedman 2005). It constitutes a strategic choice aimed at dissuading or restraining an actor—typically a sovereign state in the realm of international relations—from undertaking actions deemed undesirable, most commonly the initiation of armed conflict (RAND Corporation 2019). However, it can also refer to thinking on how countries remain economically viable once such a strategic choice has been made.
According to the theory of optimal deterrence, the governments of countries—in particular, those affected by armed conflicts—seek to continue to achieve their policy objectives despite various war-related challenges or economic challenges related to the war-based economy (Raskolnikov 2021). The primary objective, commonly framed by deterrence scholars, is to maximise social welfare. Scholars debate whether the social welfare mechanism works if an opportunity for the actors to receive benefits for their activity is higher than ‘the costs that they incur to avoid causing harm, the harm that they do’ (Polinsky & Shavell 2007).
However, such an approach has its limitations once challenged by war-related effects. Therefore, scholars have introduced the concept of direct (central) deterrence versus extended deterrence. Direct deterrence refers to the capacity (even an economic one) of the state to prevent aggression against its territory by dissuading adversaries via threats of retaliation, while extended deterrence involves a commitment to protect other states under the same deterrent framework (Driver 2019). In order to enable this direct or military deterrence, scholars have tried to evaluate the opportunity costs associated with conventional military expenditures relative to alternative forms of public fiscal spending (Alptekin & Levine 2012; Mayberry & Hicks 2024).
We will use the framework of both direct and extended deterrence to elaborate on the strategic choices that Ukraine was making, aiming to pursue its economic security as well as economic viability during war-related times. Economic viability may be enhanced or not through the implementation of various policy measures, including preferential loan schemes, targeted financial support, or grants (Slavickienė & Savickienė 2014).
After the start of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and temporary occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhanks regions, some scholars expanded the term of the ‘fifth wave’ of deterrence theory, addressing Western conceptions of deterrence, non-Western perspectives, the deterrence of non-state actors, emerging instruments and domains of deterrence, and the dynamics of deterrence-related decision-making (Osinga & Sweijs 2020).
A better understanding of the challenges and trade-offs for economic security can also be obtained from the theory of ‘five Ds’. It stems from the idea of Brauer and Anderton (Brauer & Anderton 2020), that the dichotomy between conflict and economics can be looked at from various perspectives. In particular, the war-related effects on an economy and its trade-offs can be viewed as an economic choice. Second, economic conditions can give rise to economic or kinetic conflict with even hybrid instruments. Third, conflict can be seen as a means of wealth appropriation, benefitting certain actors in their strategic decision-making. Fourth, war-related areas can impact the societal underpinnings of an economy. Fifth, conflict may affect business organisation and management. In this case study we examine the economic consequences of conflict.
Any armed conflict has multiple economic consequences for countries but, according to Brauer & Anderton (2020), the main consequences of armed conflicts can be classified into the following five categories (the so-called ‘five Ds’):
disruption, which includes, for example, war’s disruption of education, trade, and growth;
diversion, which reflects the reallocation of resources from civilian investment and goods to support attack, defence, or flight;
destruction of people, property, and ecological resources;
displacement, both of people (refugees) and of capital (capital flight);
development, for example, the investment costs of disarmament and demobilisation, of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, and of the general peace and security benefits of peace promotion.
For this article, we will also be using the theory of the ‘strategic trilemma’ that impacts Ukraine’s strategic choices during the time of Russia’s full-scale invasion. At its core, a strategic trilemma occurs when a government attempts to achieve three distinct objectives, yet only two can be successfully pursued simultaneously. For Ukraine, the three critical imperatives are: (1) upholding and restoring national sovereignty within its 1991 borders; (2) deterring and defending against Russian aggression; and (3) maintaining its economic viability (Vdovychenko et al. 2024).
The strategic trilemma does not limit the country to choosing two out of three. We stipulate that the trade-offs between the three choices with options to choose only two, have an impact to some extent on the strategic decision-making of Ukraine, trying to shape its economic security and maintain its economic viability (Chitadze et al. 2025).
Thus, the research questions for this article are:
What are the implications of the Russia’s full-scale invasion on the economic security and economic viability of Ukraine?
How do the challenges of economic security and viability impact Ukraine’s potential to deter?
Origins of the Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its macroeconomic impact
The first significant military-related hit to Ukraine’s economic security was inflicted in 2014 as a result of Russia’s occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well as hostilities in certain territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The next blow was inflicted on 24 February 2022, in the form of a full-scale military aggression that continues to this day and has developed into a protracted war of attrition.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, is the most significant interstate armed conflict in Europe since the Balkan War in the 1990s. However, although some reports have been published by business consultancies and international agencies on its possible impacts on the world economy, there has been little research on the economic and business impacts in Ukraine itself. This is understandable, given the recency of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the difficulties in obtaining reliable data on the current business situation in Ukraine. More generally, despite the increasing occurrence of armed conflicts worldwide, with a few notable exceptions (Chen 2017), there is a notable lack of research on the international business impacts of war. Most of the research that has been done has been historical studies of past wars, especially the Second World War, and most studies have focused on the economic impacts in the USA and UK, with very few studies examining impacts in the conflict zones themselves (Caplan 2002). One of the mechanisms to conduct economic deterrence remains sanctions imposed by the EU as well as other global players. On the one hand, this has led to a global slowdown in development, large-scale economic losses, rising inflation, debt, and poverty in the world; and on the other hand, to a significant deterioration in the level of economic security of Ukraine, and a negative impact on the level of economic security of a number of countries.
We will focus our attention on the ‘5Ds’ that undermined the economic security and limited the economic viability of Ukraine during the first months of the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation.
Disruption
One of the most immediate and discernible economic consequences of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been the severe disruption of trade and economic growth. On a global scale, alongside the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation, it has been a key driver of the recent deceleration in global economic activity. The war has contributed to widespread economic losses, heightened inflationary pressures, and increased sovereign debt levels, and has led to a notable rise in global poverty (Prykhodko & Shpachuk 2023).
At the beginning of 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected global GDP growth at 3.6 per cent (International Monetary Fund 2022). However, subsequent assessments by the World Bank estimate that global growth will stabilise at 2.7 per cent in both 2025 and 2026—a figure that mirrors the rates observed in 2023 and 2024, yet remains below the pre-pandemic average of 3.2 per cent for the period 2010–19 (World Bank 2025a).
Ukraine’s economy, more directly affected by the war, experienced a contraction of nearly 30 per cent in GDP in 2022. The quarterly breakdown illustrates the scale of the economic downturn: GDP declined by 14.9 per cent in Q1, 36.9 per cent in Q2, 30.6 per cent in Q3, and 31.4 per cent in Q4 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2025). Although modest economic recovery was recorded in 2023 and 2024, GDP levels have remained significantly below the benchmark established in 2021 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1.
Real GDP of Ukraine, percentage of 2021 figure (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2025).
A line chart illustrating Ukraine’s quarterly GDP decline in 2022 compared to the 2021 baseline, with four data points showing severe drops across each quarter. Quarterly GDP decline of 14.9 per cent (Q1), 36.9 per cent (Q2), 30.6 per cent (Q3), and 31.4 per cent (Q4), showing the depth of economic contraction in 2022.
In 2022, Ukraine’s negative foreign trade balance rapidly increased by almost 10 times; in 2023, it increased by another 47.2 per cent; and only in 2024, did it decrease by 5.7 per cent.
In the Competitive Industrial Performance Index (CIP) ranking, Ukraine ranked 82nd in 2022 (among 153 countries), its position worsening over the year (in 2021: 69th place):
The destruction and damage to production and logistics capacities suffered by export-oriented sectors of the Ukrainian economy during the entire period of Russian aggression have become a limiting factor for the expansion of the country’s export potential over a long period of time.
In November 2024, 139,000 km2 of Ukraine’s territory remained contaminated with explosives, preventing any economic use. In addition, Ukraine had lost up to 20 per cent of its arable land, with over 5 million hectares of agricultural land in Ukraine contaminated (Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources 2024).
The negative impacts of the war on the Ukrainian economy have been mitigated somewhat through the actions of the international community and the Ukrainian government. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, in total, approximately EUR 267 billion (as of December 2024) in aid had been allocated to Ukraine over the past three years, amounting to more than EUR 80 billion per year. Of the total, around EUR 130 billion (49 per cent) were allocated to military assistance, EUR 118 billion (44 per cent) to financial support, and EUR 19 billion (7 per cent) to humanitarian aid (Bomprezzi et al. 2025) (see Figures 2 and 3). The EU’s contribution to aid increased by another EUR 3 billion in 2025.
Figure 2.
Military aid (cumulative) to Ukraine provided by the US and Europe, February 2022–December 2024, in billion Euros (Bomprezzi et al. 2025).
A line chart comparing cumulative military aid from the US and Europe over time, showing a sharp increase in 2023–4.
Figure 3.
Non-military aid (cumulative) to Ukraine provided by the US and Europe, February 2022–December 2024, in billion Euros (Bomprezzi et al. 2025).
A line chart showing cumulative non-military (financial and humanitarian) aid to Ukraine from the US and Europe between 2022 and 2024.
The largest donors to Ukraine were the United States, EU institutions as well as EU member states, international organisations (in particular, the World Bank and IMF), Canada, United Kingdom, and Japan. On military aid, Europe’s support of EUR 62 billion is on a similar level to that of the United States, which has allocated EUR 64 billion in total. However, Europe has long surpassed the US when it comes to financial and humanitarian aid allocations (EUR 70 billion versus 50 billion) (Bomprezzi et al. 2025).
However, it should be noted that:
Almost 90 per cent of financial assistance from EU institutions was provided in the form of loans.
Approximately 60 per cent of American financial assistance was provided in the form of grants (The Economist 2025).
Given the significantly increased needs for waging war against the backdrop of limited budget revenues and external resources, the Ukrainian government was forced to seek additional sources of financing. Government debt obligations became such a source. Thanks to high rates and yields on government bonds, the Ukrainian government was able to attract UAH 1.86 trillion to the state budget using this instrument in 2022–4. Compared to 2021, the volume of bond issues during 2022–4 increased by 68 per cent, and the National Bank of the country remains the largest buyer of these bonds (see Figure 4). Such forced steps accelerate inflation and negatively affect the level of the country’s foreign exchange reserves. The additional risk and financial burden on the state budget from this step is caused by the fact that only 7.9 per cent of the funds raised from the sale of government bonds were used to finance budget expenditures, while the bulk of the funds raised was used to repay previous debts (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 2022).
Figure 4.
Structure of government bond holders in 2022–4 as a percentage (National Bank of Ukraine 2025).
A stacked bar chart showing percentage shares of domestic vs foreign investors holding Ukrainian government bonds between 2022 and 2024.
In addition to issuing government bonds, the Ukrainian government has intervened in financial markets in other ways. Among the measures and instruments that have had the greatest impact are the increase in the discount rate and the devaluation of the national currency by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU). In June 2022, the NBU increased the discount rate (the interest rate paid by commercial banks and other depository institutions on loans received from the country’s central bank) from 10 per cent to 25 per cent. A rate reduction in order to gradually ease monetary policy began only in July 2023 and continued until the end of 2024 to reach the level of 13.0 from 1 November 2024 (from 18 April 2025, the discount rate of the central bank was 15.5 per cent) (National Bank of Ukraine 2025). Unfortunately, such a reduction in the discount rate did not contribute to a significant resumption of lending by commercial banks due to a significant increase in risk; as a result, free liquidity was directed to the government bond market, which decreased the potential for economic viability.
At the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the NBU established a fixed exchange rate of 29.25 UAH per US dollar. This policy remained in effect for nearly five months and played a critical role in stabilising the financial system—a foundational requirement for both economic security and economic viability. The initial exchange rate policy had two primary effects: it alleviated inflationary pressures and stabilised public and business expectations regarding currency fluctuations, and it also mitigated rapid increases in the prices of goods and services.
On 21 July 2022, the NBU revised the official exchange rate by devaluing the hryvnia by 25 per cent, setting the new rate at 36.5686 UAH per US dollar (National Bank of Ukraine 2022a). According to the central bank, this adjustment aimed to enhance the competitiveness of domestic producers while preserving macroeconomic stability amid the challenges of wartime conditions. A further period of devaluation began toward the end of 2023, resulting in an exchange rate of 41.4706 UAH per US dollar from 1 May 2025 (National Bank of Ukraine 2025).
While exchange rate realignment was necessary from a macroeconomic management perspective, it also had adverse consequences. The biggest among them was a broad-based rise in consumer prices, particularly for imported goods or those with imported components. The depreciation of the national currency thus significantly contributed to inflationary pressures across multiple sectors of the Ukrainian economy.
Diversion
The second ‘D’ of the 5Ds is diversion of economic resources as a result of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. This is most evident in the writings of economists from the Austrian School of Economics, who view the economy’s trade-offs during wartime as ‘diverting both resources and useful labour from productive to unproductive ends’ (Kjar & Anderson 2010). They argue that, while some resources like unskilled labour can be readily transferred to other production processes in peacetime, wartime capital structures differ greatly from those in peacetime, so some resources used to produce goods in war cannot be easily transferred to civilian use after the war ends.
In such a way, this argument became essential for understanding one of the horns of Ukraine’s ‘strategic trilemma’—how to remain economically viable while trying to deter further Russian Federation attacks on both critical and civilian infrastructure. Therefore, the Ukrainian government was forced to think about economic deterrence mechanisms while redistributing a significant portion of budget revenues to military needs, rather than to investments and economic development of communities and regions. For example, in the 2025 budget of Ukraine, it is planned to spend 53 per cent of all expenditures, or 24.5 per cent of GDP, on security and defence. In 2022, 34 per cent of GDP was directed to these goals; in 2023, 28.2 per cent; and in 2024, 26.8 per cent (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2025).
The largest budget expenditure item in 2025 is UAH 1 trillion to support the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, while UAH 488 billion is allocated for the development, procurement, modernisation, and repair of weapons. For instance:
Ensuring the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: UAH 1,012 billion. These are expenses for the payment of cash benefits, social protection of personnel; provision of food and property; provision of medical care to military personnel; provision of military transportation, and insuring aircraft; training, and conducting military–political and military–technical cooperation; and fortification equipment for defence lines.
Development, procurement, modernisation, and repair of weapons: UAH 488 billion. The Government of Ukraine has planned to cover part of the expenditure requirements for these purposes at the expense of credit resources: the UK Government will provide Ukraine with a loan of UAH 118.4 billion in 2025.
Ensuring the activities of the National Guard of Ukraine: UAH 161 billion. This budget programme includes expenditure for the participation of the National Guard in operations by the defence forces to repel the armed aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine; conducting stabilisation actions and territorial defence of the state; maintaining public order; and protecting state authorities and important state facilities.
Reform and development of the defence–industrial complex: UAH 55 billion. These are expenditures for the development, mastering, and implementation of new technologies, the creation and expansion of existing production capacities for the manufacture of defence products; and for the restoration, re-equipment, and modernisation of production capacities of the defence industry (Law of Ukraine 2024).
At the same time, this spending structure allows the state to create a unique basis for post-war development and restoration of economic security. Today’s development of the defence industry and defence technologies is a potential driver of post-war economic growth and export potential of the country.
As a separate item of expenditure, it is necessary to highlight the costs, both today and in the future, not so much for development as for the restoration of the destruction caused by military aggression.
Throughout the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian government has also actively issued military bonds. According to its allocation, this economic deterrence instrument was used to support the state budget, which is available to citizens, businesses, and to stabilize the investment environment of Ukraine. The issuance of military bonds was used to ensure the uninterrupted financial activities of the state during the martial law period, particularly in the sectors of social services and defence. As of 1 January 2025, it amounted to:
UAH 92,375.4 million, or 27.6 per cent of the total volume of purchased hryvnia-denominated military government bonds (at 1 December 2024, UAH 86,861.6 million, or 29.8 per cent);
USD 1,625.1 million, or 56.4 per cent of the total volume of military government bonds denominated in USD (at 1 December 2024, USD 1,483.4 million, or 51.5 per cent);
EUR 245.8 million, or 43.7 per cent of the total volume of government bonds denominated in EUR (at 1 December 2024, EUR 163.6 million, or 29.1 per cent).
The largest volume of military bonds is concentrated in the commercial banks of Ukraine. The total portfolio of military bonds as of 1 January 2025 was:
owned by individuals and legal entities: UAH 171.4 billion equivalent compared to UAH 85.4 billion equivalent at 1 January 2024, a twofold increase;
owned by non-residents: UAH 7,472.7 million, USD 30.2 million and EUR 0.1 million (Statistics on the Sale and Redemption of Government Bonds 2024).
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated existing imbalances, changed the conditions and principles under which the labour market operated, and has moved it into a more uncertain phase. The loss and damage to production assets and infrastructure, and the disruption of supply chains and trade networks have weakened the potential of the labour market, leading to ‘disruptions’ and the loss of employment opportunities for the majority of Ukrainians, who were trying to physically and economically protect their families as well as households, at the same time as trying to remain economically viable. In such conditions of macroeconomic instability, employment was sharply reduced, unemployment was rising, the quality of the labour force was deteriorating, and tensions in the labour market were growing (Analytical report of the Razumkov Center 2024). In addition, Russia’s full-scale invasion led to a significant loss of human resources that could have been used in the economy, including after the war, in the process of rebuilding the country. All this is happening against the background of the fact that Ukraine remains among the European countries with the worst life expectancy indicators, to which are added various post-traumatic symptoms that will haunt not only the participants in the fighting, but also the civilian population for many years after the war. According to UN estimates, during 2022–3, the total population of Ukraine within internationally recognised borders decreased by 6.5 million people (−15 per cent), to 37.4 million people at the beginning of 2024 (United Nations 2024).
Due to conscription and migration of workers, there was a shortage of agricultural workers, such as tractor drivers, to work in the fields. Active hostilities also damaged the internal transport infrastructure (mainly railways) and seaports on the Black Sea, as well as the infrastructure for the storage and processing of agricultural products. There is also a break in the usual transport chains caused by the blockade of ports, as priority is given to military and humanitarian cargo. As a result, agricultural products are exported using alternative transportation routes, such as rail through neighbouring countries and river barges.
Destruction
The third ‘D’ of our 5D mechanism is related to economic and physical destruction. Within Ukraine itself, the Russian invasion has obviously resulted in significant damage to Ukraine’s economic assets. By August 2022, the total amount of direct losses to Ukraine from the destruction of infrastructure and equipment had already amounted to USD 113.5 billion (including damage to or capture of 388 factories and enterprises, 19 airports, 206,000 units of transport, 2,290 educational institutions, 131,300 residential buildings, 2,018 stores, 634 cultural facilities, and 28 oil depots).
The documented total of direct damage to Ukraine’s economy caused by the full-scale Russian invasion reached USD 155 billion (at replacement cost) by January 2024 (see Figure 5) and USD 170 billion at the end of 2024. Fortunately, however, the pace of the increase in damage has levelled off since spring 2023. The scale of the damage is equivalent to Ukraine’s current GDP, which demonstrates that the toll is unbearable for Ukraine alone (Nivievskyi et al. 2024). Damage continued to be concentrated in the Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Sumy, and Kyiv regions. There was disruption to economic flows and production, as well as additional costs associated with the full-scale invasion (such as debris management). The largest nuclear power plant in Europe, Zaporizhzhia, remains occupied (the capacity of the Zaporizhzhia NPP was more than 10 per cent of the entire capacity of the Ukrainian energy system before the Russian full-scale invasion).
Figure 5.
War damages and economy (Nivievskyi et al. 2024).
An composite figure summarising the estimated war damages in relation to Ukraine’s economic indicators, showing infrastructure losses and GDP impact.
At the end of December 2023, recovery and reconstruction needs were estimated at USD 486 billion (EUR 440 billion), approximately 2.8 times the estimated nominal GDP of Ukraine for 2023 (RDNA3 2024). According to the ‘Rapid Assessment of Damage and Recovery Needs’ (RDNA4) (from 24 February 2022 to 31 December 2024), prepared by the World Bank Group, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission, and the UN, the cost of post-war reconstruction in Ukraine at the end of 2024 amounted to almost USD 524 billion, exceeding previous estimates (RDNA3) by USD 38 billion (RDNA4 2025). The following areas suffered the greatest losses:
Damage to transport infrastructure—roads, ports, and aviation—is estimated at USD 38.5 billion.
Ukraine’s energy sector has lost assets worth USD 14.6 billion. As a result of Russian attacks, the Kakhovka and Dniprovska hydroelectric power plants, and Trypillya and Zmiivska thermal power plants were completely destroyed, and a significant number of other generating capacities, as well as high-voltage substations and oil and gas infrastructure facilities, were damaged or destroyed.
Almost the same losses—USD 14.4 billion—were suffered by industry and construction. Enterprises lost equipment, production areas, and logistics capacities. As of November 2024, almost 500 large and medium-sized private and state-owned enterprises had been destroyed or seriously damaged.
More than 4,000 educational institutions were damaged or destroyed, including 229 schools, 110 kindergartens, and 97 universities destroyed. In addition, more than 1,500 medical facilities were destroyed or damaged (KSE Institute 2022).
Disruptions to economic flows and production (for example, decreases in output prices and/or increases in production costs), as well as additional costs associated with war, are collectively measured as an economic loss amounting to over USD 499 billion (in December 2023) (RDNA3 2024).
In addition, Russia has occupied about 20 per cent of the territory of Ukraine that contains metals, minerals, and energy resources worth USD 12.4 trillion, comprising coal deposits (63 per cent), oil deposits (11 per cent), gas (20 per cent), metals (42 per cent), and rare earth and other important minerals (33 per cent) (Faiola & Bennett 2022).
Displacement
Another economic impact is that many Ukrainian citizens have partially or completely lost their jobs as a result of the war, often due to forced relocation to other safer regions. At the start of the war, 13.5 million people—approximately one third of Ukraine’s population—were displaced. Some have since returned to their places of origin. By mid-August 2022, 6.65 million Ukrainian citizens had left for Europe, of whom almost 4 million people—mostly women and children—received temporary protection in one of the European countries. More than three million citizens of Ukraine were taken voluntarily or forcibly to the territory of Russia from the occupied territories of the East and South of Ukraine. In December 2023, an estimated 5.9 million people were recorded as refugees across Europe, compared with 8.1 million in February 2023 (RDNA3 2024).
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in mid-January 2025, approximately 6.9 million Ukrainian refugees were registered globally, with 6.3 million residing in Europe. Poland currently hosts over 993,000 Ukrainians under temporary protection, although this figure reached 1.9 million cumulatively since the onset of the full-scale invasion. In Germany, more than 1.243 million Ukrainians had obtained temporary protection by the same date. An estimated 1.269 million Ukrainians were reported to be in the Russian Federation and Belarus.
UNHCR data also indicate a declining trend in the proportion of refugees intending to return to Ukraine: from 77 per cent in early 2023 to 65 per cent in early 2024, and further down to 61 per cent by the beginning of 2025 (Refugees from Ukraine recorded beyond Europe 2025). This decline signifies a continued erosion of Ukraine’s human and entrepreneurial capital due to forced displacement abroad. The long-term implications are considerable: according to estimates, Ukraine may lose up to 5 per cent of its pre-war GDP annually as a result. Supporting this concern, a survey conducted in August 2024 revealed that 63 per cent of Ukrainian businesses identified labour shortages as their most pressing operational challenge (Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting 2024).
Beyond the loss of human capital, the displacement of the Ukrainian population has contributed to capital flight and business relocation abroad. Preliminary estimates suggest that, during the first year of the war, Ukrainian individuals and entities transferred approximately USD 35 billion out of the country. This capital outflow poses a significant threat to Ukraine’s macroeconomic stability and future growth potential.
One of the principal channels for this outflow remains the persistent foreign trade deficit. In the context of ongoing war, Ukraine’s external trade balance has deteriorated markedly. According to balance of payments data, in 2022, the foreign trade deficit increased tenfold, reaching USD 25.7 billion. This was driven primarily by a sharper decline in exports compared to imports, alongside a surge in imports of services. The trend continued in 2023–4. By the end of 2023, the negative trade balance had risen to USD 37.9 billion, attributed to an almost twofold increase in the goods trade deficit (USD 29.1 billion), albeit partially offset by a USD 2.3 billion reduction in the services trade deficit (to USD 8.7 billion). Preliminary figures for 2024 indicate a slight improvement, with the total foreign trade deficit decreasing by 5.8 per cent to USD 35.7 billion. This was largely due to a USD 3 billion decline in overseas spending by Ukrainian travellers and temporary migrants, while the deficit in goods trade increased marginally by USD 1 billion (Bazylyuk et al. 2025).
Development
As the conflict continues, significant development efforts are yet to be seen, representing the last ‘D’ of the 5D mechanism. However, a preliminary assessment by a group comprising the World Bank, the Ukrainian government, the European Commission, and the UN estimated that the cost of post-war reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine’s economy by the end of 2024 would be almost USD 524 billion. The housing sector, transport, energy and mining sectors, trade, and industry were the most affected. About 72 per cent of the total damage falling on all sectors was located closest to the contact line of the regions (Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson), as well as the Kyiv region (RDNA4 2025).
Sectors that will require priority reconstruction and significant capital investment include:
housing sector: almost USD 84 billion (EUR 81 billion),
transport sector: almost USD 78 billion (EUR 75 billion),
energy and mining sector: USD 68 billion (EUR 66 billion),
trade and industry: over USD 64 billion (EUR 62 billion),
agriculture: over USD 55 billion (EUR 53 billion),
costs for clearing and managing the remains of the destruction: almost USD 13 billion (EUR 12.6 billion) (World Bank 2025b).
In 2025, with the support of donors, the Government of Ukraine allocated USD 7.37 billion (7.12 billion EUR) to address priority tasks in areas such as housing, education, health care, social protection, energy, transport, water supply, demining, and civil protection. The overall funding gap for recovery and reconstruction needs in 2025 is USD 9.96 billion (EUR 9.62 billion) (World Bank 2025b).
To overcome the immediate and long-term consequences of the war in Ukraine, a number of international projects aimed at restoring important branches of the country’s functioning have been implemented and planned. These projects are supported by such international organisations as the World Bank, EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), and FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):
(1)
One critical project is to restore the main logistics infrastructure and connect it to the network, the purpose of which is to mitigate the impact of disrupted transport networks on the economy and population of Ukraine. The World Bank is financing this project with a budget of USD 585 million.
(2)
The project ‘Promoting Health and Saving Lives in Ukraine’ is another World Bank initiative aimed at restoring and improving access to basic medical services, meeting new and urgent needs in the field of health care and providing financial protection during emergencies. The budget of this project is USD 500 million.
(3)
Energy infrastructure is crucial for Ukraine’s economic recovery. The project ‘Emergency restoration of the Ukrenergo power transmission network’, financed by the EBRD, the USA, and the Netherlands, is aimed at restoring the energy network of Ukraine, which was badly damaged by Russian bombing. The budget of the project is EUR 370 million.
(4)
The NEFCO (The Nordic Green Bank) Green Recovery programme for Ukraine with a budget of EUR 50 million is aimed at providing financial and technical assistance to municipalities for the repair and reconstruction of residential infrastructure in an environmentally sustainable manner. The programme also covers investments and measures related to heating, water supply, and drainage.
(5)
The UNDP project ‘Supporting early recovery in war-affected areas’ with a budget of USD 4.19 million focuses on dealing with debris, destruction, and explosive ordnance, environmental threats, and damage to infrastructure and utilities.
(6)
The budget of the Ukraine Recovery Program, which is financed by the EIB (European Investment Bank) and the Government of Ukraine, amounts to EUR 340 million, and is aimed at restoring social and critical infrastructure in ten regions. The programme supports the restoration of schools, kindergartens, hospitals, heating, water supply and sewage facilities, etc. (ASDE 2023).
Risks and threats to economic security
In view of the above, it should be noted that the first significant hit to Ukraine’s economic security relating to military action was inflicted in 2014 as a result of Russia’s occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well as hostilities in certain territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The next hit was inflicted on 24 February 2022 in the form of full-scale military aggression, which continues to this day and has developed into a protracted war of attrition.
As a result of such actions by Russia, significant risks and challenges have been created for Ukraine’s economic security and economy in both the short and long term. Among the main factors that provoked a significant deterioration in the economic security of Ukraine, the following should be highlighted:
deterioration of the demographic situation and a significant reduction in personnel potential, both as a result of deaths during the occupation and participation in hostilities, and as a result of forced emigration of part of the population outside the country or displacement within the country;
receipt of international assistance mainly in the form of loans;
destruction of material assets that were involved in the functioning of the economy, and the livelihoods of the population;
destruction of critical infrastructure facilities;
depletion of financial reserves of the state, population, and business; growth of economic imbalances that formed during the period of war: directing funds mainly for military purposes, and not for the development of the state; a significant increase in external and internal state debt, etc;
Russia currently occupies about 20 per cent of the territory of Ukraine, which includes a significant part of the Kherson, Zaporizhia, Sumy, Donetsk, Luhansk regions, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; in 2014, Russia seized about 7 per cent of Ukraine’s territory;
the occupied territories contain significant deposits of metals, minerals, and energy resources.
In 2024, the state of Ukraine’s economic security stabilised, but fundamental challenges and threats caused by the war persist, and destruction, damage, and losses continue to grow. Regarding the main economic security risks that arose during the full-scale invasion and complicate the formation and provision of the state’s economic security, the following should be highlighted:
First, the reformatting of most of the economy and industry to meet the military needs of the state, rather than development; a critical reduction in industrial production and a reduction in state investment.
Second, the growth of defence spending, for the needs of the army, with a constant decrease in tax revenues, which makes it impossible to cover them with its own funds. Ukraine’s need for additional funds amounts to USD 4.5–5 billion per month, while:
Ukraine receives most international financial assistance in the form of loans.
The shortage of funds is covered by the issuance of government loan bonds and additional issue of hryvnias by the National Bank of Ukraine to finance the budget and expenditure.
All this is happening against the background of the fact that Russia plans to spend about 6 per cent of its GDP on the army.
Third, a significant ratio of public debt to GDP, which in 2025 could reach 100 per cent, which effectively means bankruptcy. It should also be taken into account that a significant part of the debt was contracted by Ukraine in foreign currency (approximately 60 per cent).
Fourth, the destruction of logistical corridors for both exports and necessary critical imports.
Fifth, the closure of enterprises and downsizing both due to the destruction of assets and due to constant shelling and lack of security, logistical problems, deaths, and population migration.
Sixth, social risk, caused by a significant deterioration in the socio-economic situation of vulnerable groups of the population, a decrease in the ability of the social protection system of Ukraine to perform its functions, a decrease in the well-being and quality of life of the population, an increase in the burden on the social infrastructure and labour market of densely populated and traditionally overloaded western regions of Ukraine, a deterioration in access to social services and living conditions of significant groups of the population due to the destruction of housing and civil infrastructure, etc.
Seventh, the ‘fatigue’ of Ukraine’s partners with the ongoing war and, as a result, a decrease in the level of aid below that critically needed, and constant delays in aid delivery, despite constant assurances of support for Ukraine until its victory.
Among the potential triggers for increasing economic security risks, the following should be highlighted:
a constant decrease in the capacity of the budget system, and sometimes the inability to ensure the implementation of planned expenditures;
an increase in the negative trade balance;
a decrease in the competitiveness of Ukrainian producers due to prolonged underinvestment, cessation of innovation, and an increase in additional costs;
a deterioration in the economy’s ability to ensure food security due to negative processes in the agricultural sector;
an excessive influx of imported consumer and industrial goods;
the negative impact of the war on ecology and the environment.
Business outlook
Despite the risks, there are still reasons to be optimistic and there are still business opportunities (Shpachuk & Chen 2024). Business in the first quarter of 2025 remained optimistic about the growth of business activity in the next 12 months: the business expectations index increased to 108.2 per cent from 101.8 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2024. Business representatives gave a positive assessment of the prospects for the financial and economic development of their enterprises for the next 12 months: the balance of responses was 4.7 per cent versus −1.2 per cent in the fourth quarter. Improvement in expectations was recorded for most industries, especially in construction and manufacturing. At the same time, survey participants from the trade, transport, and communications sectors remained pessimistic.
Respondents also improved their assessments of investments in machinery, equipment, and inventory—the balance of responses increased to 13.4 from 9.3 per cent in the previous quarter. For the first time in three years, the assessment of investments in construction became positive: 2.7 per cent versus −1.6 per cent previously (National Bank of Ukraine 2022b).
Enterprises receiving foreign investment have strengthened their expectations for their growth over the next year: the balance of responses increased to 17.2 per cent from 10.6 per cent. Companies in the energy sector, water supply, and mining industries demonstrated the greatest optimism. At the same time, the share of enterprises planning to attract foreign investment decreased to 19.2 per cent compared to 21.6 per cent in the previous survey. For the third quarter in a row, respondents report improved conditions for access to bank loans: the balance of responses was 17.3 per cent (in the fourth quarter: 16.3 per cent). The share of enterprises planning to attract financing abroad decreased to 7.1 per cent compared to 8.5 per cent in the previous survey (National Bank of Ukraine 2025).
However, despite the war, many companies plan to continue operating in the Ukrainian market, and some declare their intention to invest in Ukraine even in wartime or are already investing despite the existing investment risks. In particular, owners and managers of Ukrainian enterprises plan to invest in the agricultural sector, energy, IT and telecommunications, construction, pharmaceuticals, consumer goods, real estate, and others. The production of consumer goods has been preserved and is being restored, mainly in the relatively calm central-western regions. The work of retail chains, construction companies, and food industry enterprises is being restored. Mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, and light industry are increasing production, mainly due to an increase in government orders to support the army.
Opportunities are also expected as a result of the inevitable reconstruction that will be required after the end of the war. The Government of Ukraine has estimated that the total financing needs for the recovery and modernisation of the economy after the conflict has ended will be USD 524 billion. Sectors that will require priority recovery, as well as significant capital and investment after the end of hostilities, include: construction; the military–industrial complex; industry; transport; and energy.
Conclusions
This paper has examined the evolution of Ukraine’s wartime economy and its broader implications for national and international security. Drawing from macroeconomic data, policy documents, and security developments, the analysis offers several core insights.
Crucially, the trilemma framework introduced in this paper emerges as a powerful theoretical lens for explaining the interdependence and trade-offs among the imperatives facing Ukrainian leadership: ensuring state survival (economic, in particular), conducting deterrence, and maintaining economic viability. This trilemma does not imply the impossibility of reconciling all three objectives, but it reveals the strategic choices made by the Ukrainian government, in particular to provide economic security and economic viability. Such a model may be broadly applicable to other democratic states under existential threat.
Moreover, the application of the ‘5D’ framework—disruption, denial, degradation, deception, and deterrence—allows for a more nuanced understanding of how Ukraine’s strategy has evolved beyond conventional battlefield calculus, integrating cyber operations, information campaigns, and proactive economic management.
Despite the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience under conditions of sustained military aggression. While suffering an unprecedented contraction of GDP in 2022, Ukraine has managed to stabilise key macroeconomic indicators through strategic interventions, including fixed exchange rate policies, targeted fiscal spending, and international aid. The rapid adaptation of industry—particularly the defence–industrial complex—also reflects an evolving war economy capable of meeting urgent national security demands.
At the same time, the war has revealed both vulnerabilities and new opportunities for economic security. Capital flight, labour shortages, and the loss of entrepreneurial potential due to forced migration have posed severe structural challenges. However, these have been partially offset by increased investment in defence technologies, including AI and drone systems, and a reorientation of production chains. The war has created a dual imperative: to ensure survival and to position Ukraine as a future security and innovation hub within Europe.
The case study of Ukraine during the period of the full-scale invasion underscores the broader implications of war economies for international economic governance and development paradigms. The country’s experience highlights the need to rethink conventional models of post-conflict reconstruction by incorporating real-time adaptive economic security strategies. Ukraine’s situation also challenges normative assumptions in international political economy, especially concerning the role of state intervention, public–private cooperation, and defence-led economic modernisation.
Finally, the findings suggest that Ukraine’s path toward economic recovery and sustainable security will depend not only on continued military support and diplomatic backing from allies but also on a comprehensive framework for integrating displaced labour, leveraging diaspora capital, and maintaining investor confidence. Continued academic inquiry into the interplay between national security and economic viability in conflict zones is warranted, with Ukraine providing a critical case study for such exploration.
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DOI: 10.5871/jba/013.a44
Published on: 3 December 2025
Volume: 13
Issue: Issue 4
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Shpachuk, V. & Vdovychenko, V. (2025), ‘Economic deterrence versus economic viability of Ukraine during the time of Russia’s full-scale invasion: risks and opportunities’, Journal of the British Academy, 13(4): a44 https://doi.org/10.5871/jba/013.a44Crossref
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