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Thematic Article
Citizen deliberation in Net Zero governance: learning lessons and looking forward
,
Liam Killeen‡
, Pancho Lewis§
, Alfie Shepherd¶
, Rebecca Willis♠
Abstract
Since 2019, public and third-sector bodies across the UK have been experimenting with citizens’ juries and assemblies in the context of net-zero governance—collectively referred to in this essay as ‘climate assemblies’. These assemblies bring together a representative sample of citizens to learn about and discuss policy issues, prior to making recommendations for action. With the UK off track to meet it’s 2030 climate targets, advocates hope these fora can drive policy on net zero that is both ambitious and garners public support. This essay draws on social science evidence to appraises the recent wave of climate assemblies against four often-cited objectives for such processes: providing knowledge to policymakers about public preferences and lived experiences; encouraging policy action by demonstrating a public mandate; improving public trust in leaders and governance institutions; and providing a mechanism for oversight and accountability. We show that the first of these objectives has largely been met. Climate assemblies have also succeeded in demonstrating a mandate in terms of proposals being consistently ahead of existing policy, although there are no clear cases of climate assemblies increasing policy ambition. Climate assemblies can help build trust amongst those taking part, but this dissipates if the commissioning body is not subsequently seen to act. Climate assemblies are not widely known about amongst the wider population, and there is a lack of evidence on how they impact trust perceptions amongst those who do hear of them. Finally, there are very few examples of assemblies being tasked with an oversight or accountability role, an area we suggest could benefit from further experimentation. We conclude with a series of recommendations for further embedding climate juries within net-zero governance, aimed at improving their ability to contribute to the net-zero transition. This article is published in the thematic collection ‘The critical role of governance for decarbonisation at pace: learning the lessons from SHAPE research’, edited by Sarah Birch, Hilary Graham, Andrew Jordan, Tim O’Riordan, Henry Richards.
Keywords
climate assembliesnet zero governancecitizens’ juriespublic trustoversightaccountabilitypublic preferenceIntroduction
Since 2019, there has been an upsurge in the use of deliberative methods such as citizens’ assemblies in the context of climate policy and governance. This reflects growing appreciation of the necessity of effective public engagement for achieving net zero emissions within the rapidly closing window of time available to avoid catastrophic climate change. Whilst technical expertise is essential for designing climate solutions, it is increasingly evident that effective climate policy requires a deeper understanding and engagement with the attitudes, values, and lived experiences of the communities at the forefront of the transition. Experimentation with new approaches to participatory policymaking are therefore clearly welcome. Effectively embedding these methods within climate governance institutions requires continuous reflection and ‘learning by doing’. The SHAPE disciplines have a significant role to play here in helping design effect public participation methods, as well as understanding what works, where, and why.
In this paper, we draw on our own work and social science literature to take stock and suggest ways forward for climate deliberation. In Section 1, we introduce the concept of deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) and present four key objectives of their use in policymaking: knowledge provision; building a mandate for action; increasing trust in policymaking institutions; and increasing accountability. In Section 2, we review how DMPs have been used in climate policy to date in the UK, by whom, and for what purposes. Section 3 draws from this review and the wider literature to assess how well DMPs have delivered on the four objectives. Finally, in Section 4, we map out avenues for the future use of citizen deliberation in net-zero governance.
What is citizen deliberation and how does it relate to net-zero governance?
Previous work by the British Academy (2024) identified that effective net-zero governance requires productive interactions between leaders and publics. Leaders need to provide direction. Publics hold useful knowledge not readily available to decision-makers, and need to grant leaders a mandate to act on net zero. Finally, publics can play a role in holding leaders to account both through the ballot box and through other institutional mechanisms.
This paper focuses on an institutional innovation that, it is hoped, can contribute to more productive relationships between leaders and publics as we navigate the rapid transition to a net-zero society—DMPs. DMPs are a family of methods, with the most common being citizens’ assemblies and citizens’ juries. They are bodies of citizens tasked with carrying out some governance function—typically developing proposals to address a policy challenge. They are usually made up of 20 to 100 people, selected to be broadly representative of a larger population. ‘Juries’ and ‘assemblies’ are differentiated only by the number of participants and length of process, with the latter term reserved for larger processes. DMPs are distinguished from focus groups by the amount of time participants are given to learn about the policy area from experts, and to deliberate over a preferable course of action.
DMPs emerged from a confluence of practitioner-led experimentation and ideas developed by social scientists and political theorists in the field of ‘deliberative democracy’. Deliberative democrats broadly believe that navigating societal challenges is aided by fostering mutual understanding among citizens, and that democratic legitimacy rests on decisions being reached through a process of open and fair deliberation (Habermas 1997; Cohen 2003). Originally designed as ideal deliberative spaces, DMPs are now understood as having a variety of functions within wider (imperfectly deliberative) political systems (Curato et al. 2024). Though few promote the empowerment of DMPs to make binding decisions, many see them as a form of democratic participation that should open new avenues for citizen power and influence—even if only via their impact on the wider public sphere (Lafont 2019; Mellier & Capstick 2024). As we will discuss, this ambition can stand in tension with the tendency of policymakers to see DMPs primarily as tools for gathering evidence on public preferences.
Though DMPs have been used in other policy areas for decades, they are relatively new in the context of net-zero governance. We refer to such uses primarily as ‘climate assemblies’ for convenience, though many processes discussed have been of the smaller ‘jury’ style. The rest of the essay focuses on four oft-cited objectives of climate assemblies:
Knowledge provision: providing policy-relevant information to policymakers from citizens’ lived experiences, as well as information about informed public preferences. Informed public preferences are those held after a process of learning and deliberation, in contrast to ‘raw’ public preferences gathered through opinion polling.
Mandate for action: catalysing ambitious net-zero policy action by demonstrating a public mandate.
Increased trust: making governance more participatory and responsive, to increase public trust in leaders and institutions.
Oversight and accountability: using citizens’ vigilance to hold policy actors accountable, and ensure they deliver on promises.
How have DMPs been used in UK net-zero governance?
Most recent climate assemblies have been held in Europe, and the UK has seen the most of any European country (Curato et al. 2024). This can in part be traced to a commitment to hold climate assemblies being included in many ‘climate emergency’ declarations made by UK local authorities (Lewis et al. 2023). In this section, we map out where these assemblies have been held, why, and by whom.
Our initial review covered thirty-nine climate assemblies run between 2019 and 2023, with a peak of processes in 2021 (see Figure 1). These ranged in size from sixteen participants in a process held by the City of Wolverhampton Council, to 110 in Scotland’s national assembly.
Figure 1.
Location, year, and type of commissioning body for the thirty-nine climate assemblies initially reviewed.
Where, when, why, and by whom have climate assemblies been held?
Climate assemblies have mainly been local or regional in scope, with three at a national level: Climate Assembly UK, Scotland’s Climate Assembly, and an assembly held by the autonomous government of the UK dependency of Jersey. The local processes have typically clustered in major urban areas and been run by district/city level or unitary authorities. Almost a quarter were commissioned by London borough councils. Typically, the participants were selected to be demographically representative of the population of the area over which the commissioning body had jurisdiction. Seven of the thirty-nine assemblies were not run directly by state institutions. However, four of these were run with significant involvement by local government. Just three processes were totally independent of state institutions. These were all run for research purposes by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) think-tank.
The manner in which climate assemblies have been integrated into governance institution is fairly uniform. They have, almost without exception, been commissioned as one-off processes to feed into or direct policy formulation in an advisory capacity. Commissioning bodies have typically not made clear the substantive objectives of the processes, beyond providing recommendations in response to an initial framing question.1 Accordingly, the degree to which the commissioning bodies planned for the integration of recommendations varies drastically. Although the Scottish Assembly, for example, established a clear process for recommendations to be followed through the legislative process, this was not the case in all instances (see Box 1) (Lewis et al. 2023).
In very few instances, there have been experiments with climate assemblies playing an oversight or accountability role. This happened in an attenuated sense with Climate Assembly UK. The Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Select Committee, which commissioned the Assembly, established a standing inquiry to use the recommendations to scrutinise government policy announcements. Though this inquiry held just one evidence session and produced one report.
What kinds of recommendations have climate assemblies produced?
If leaders have been looking to climate assemblies for information about public attitudes, what have they been hearing? To answer this question, we conducted a synthesis of recommendations from thirty of the initial thirty-nine processes in our review. Only those that achieved certain standards in terms of recruitment methods, sample size, provision of expertise, and effective governance structures were included.2
In keeping with other research (Elstub et al. 2021; Andrews et al. 2022; Curato et al. 2024), our analysis shows a consistent message of strong support for action, and shows that climate assemblies typically produce recommendations which are more ambitious than current government policy.
The most supported recommendation in citizens’ assemblies was a public communication and education programme. On transport, assemblies were particularly supportive of promoting and improving active travel options, as well as making public transport more accessible and affordable. There was also strong support across climate assemblies for policies which reduced emissions from the home, including regulations for new-builds to be compatible with net zero; additional financial support for homeowners to undertake retrofit work; and increased access to advice services and information on the changes homeowners could make. The synthesis showed a clear focus on ensuring that behavioural changes are affordable and accessible for all.
The work also showed some interesting themes regarding the general content and form of the recommendations. Assemblies were often tasked with addressing the climate crisis in its entirety. Such a broad scope resulted in somewhat generalised recommendations. This can make recommendations difficult for policymakers to interpret and implement, potentially limiting the impact of the assemblies. This concern has been substantiated through in-depth research on the Oxford and Leeds local juries, and the Scottish national process (Wells et al. 2021; Andrews et al. 2022).
Whose views are being heard?
Most UK climate assemblies have been recruited to be broadly representative of the wider public in terms of demographics and levels of concern about climate change. Though some have focused on specific groups such as homeowners or social housing tenants (Shared Future 2021; Ainscough & Willis 2024).
Although not typically used as a screening criterion, research from our group suggests more attention is needed on the political worldview of participants. Data from several local climate assemblies suggests those with right-of-centre political views are less likely to volunteer to take part. This group can therefore be under-represented in the final sample (Coxcoon 2024). This is important going forward as the majority of processes thus far have been held by Labour-controlled councils, so efforts must be made to ensure climate assemblies are not politically biased (Shepherd 2024).
Accessing the recent wave of climate assemblies
In this next section, we draw from our review and the wider literature to explore how well climate assemblies have delivered on the four objectives outlined in Section 1.
Knowledge provision
Climate assemblies have proven a successful vehicle for helping policymakers understand which policies work for people and are seen as acceptable. This is a commonly noted reason from policymakers for running a climate assembly (Elstub et al. 2021; Sandover et al. 2021; Duvic-Paoli 2022). For example, the Climate Change Committee, the UK statutory advisor on emissions targets, has recently added citizens’ assemblies to its repertoire for researching citizen preferences. In these cases, climate assemblies sit alongside other methods for gauging public opinion, such as opinion polling, and the findings constitute ‘data’ for policymakers to consider (Duvic-Paoli 2022). Though this is a perfectly legitimate use of climate assemblies, it can sit uneasily alongside the expectations of campaigners or participants who believe commissioning bodies have some duty to act on recommendations (Sandover et al. 2021). Some may argue that deliberative exercises held purely for information-gathering purposes should not be termed ‘citizens’ assemblies’, as this term was originally intended to describe processes aimed at citizen empowerment, although such a clear demarcation would be challenging, as UK climate assemblies have thus far all been purely advisory.
Mandate for action
UK climate assemblies have reliably demonstrated a mandate for more ambitious climate policy, at least in the sense of producing recommendations ahead of enacted policy. However, a stronger test for the ‘mandate’ objective is whether policymakers feel able or even obliged to act on this information. Though this is not the only way that climate assemblies can impact on governance, it is this direct policy follow-through that many look to as a metric of success (Curato et al. 2024). This sets a high bar, as it is rare that a single policy input is linked directly to specific policy changes (Lewis et al. 2023). It is also difficult to study as policy impact can take many years, and simple alignment between assembly recommendations and policy announcements is not enough to demonstrate a causal relationship. These difficulties mean there is a paucity of in-depth case study research on policy take-up following climate assemblies.
With these caveats in mind, the available evidence suggests UK climate assemblies have, at least in some instances, given policymakers the confidence to introduce policy measures they had been considering. There is less evidence that policymakers have felt empowered or obliged to bring in stronger measures than were already being considered. This finding is matched by the existing internationally focused research (Boswell et al. 2023; Duvic-Paoli 2022; Ejsing et al. 2023; Jacquet et al. 2024b; Mellier & Capstick 2024). Table 1 covers three examples where commissioners have acted on assembly recommendations. These represent some of the best studied assemblies and we do not know whether they are representative of the wider pool of examples.
Table 1
Examples of climate assemblies providing a mandate for action from commissioning bodies.
| Climate assembly and date | Institutional context | Evidence of mandate |
|---|---|---|
| Climate Assembly UK, 2020 | Commissioned by six Select Committees of UK Parliament. Final report sent to Committees in September 2020. Committees held short inquiry on the uptake of results within government, which reported in July 2021. | Committees scrutinised degree to which government had taken up recommendations. Though only held one evidence session and produced one report (BEIS Committee 2021). There is no compelling evidence that recommendations were a factor in later government decision making (Duvic-Paoli 2022; Carrick & Elstub 2024). |
| Scotland’s Climate Assembly, 2020–1 | Commissioned by the Scottish Government. Secretariat maintained beyond life of assembly to oversee engagement with government officials and members of Parliament. | One third of recommendations that matched existing or planned policies were actioned by government. Others were either abandoned, considered too broad to be actionable, or were deemed to be out of remit (Andrews et al. 2022). |
| Oxford Citizens’ Assembly on Climate Change, 2019 | Commissioned by Oxford City Council as part of Climate Emergency Declaration. | Findings ‘created momentum’ and reassured politicians of public support. Council followed up with a £19 million funding package to support decarbonisation (Wells et al. 2021). |
The contribution to a ‘mandate’ from a climate assembly can also operate via wider public or civil society groups. Publics or civil society groups can mobilise to support assembly recommendations (Mellier & Capstick 2024). Members of the public could also update their own policy preferences in light of the assemblies’ findings, reasoning that ‘I would probably support this if I had been through a similar process.’ There is, however, very little evidence of such a mechanism operating in the UK in the existing literature. Studies that have looked at this issue report minimal awareness of climate assemblies or their proposals amongst the wider public (Wells et al. 2021; Carrick & Elstub 2024).
Increased trust
The third objective of integrating citizens’ assemblies into net-zero governance is to increase trust in leaders and institutions. This is especially important for navigating contentious issues such as changes to diets and reductions in car use.
Climate assemblies have proven successful in increasing trust in decision-making institutions amongst those taking part; however, this can dissipate if the commissioning body is not seen to act on proposals. In the case of both the UK and the Scottish national assemblies, participants’ initial increased belief in the working of the UK political system turned to distrust following a lack of action (Elstub et al. 2021; Andrews 2022; Andrews et al. 2022; Carrick & Elstub 2024). This finding is matched in the wider literature on citizens’ assemblies and juries (Germann et al. 2022; Van Dijk & Lefevere 2023). In Box 1, we present an in-depth case study showing this dynamic playing out after the Copeland climate jury in West Cumbria.
Box 1
Case study: What happens when nothing happens?
In July 2021, thirty residents took part in the Copeland People’s Panel to explore what the local area should do to respond to climate change. They presented their recommendations to Copeland Council with the expectation that the Council would seek to implement some or many of them.
Eleven of the thirty residents were interviewed in January 2024. They reported how much time and work they invested in the Panel and the belief they had developed strong policies that could lead to significant change.
‘I think we had that sort of hopefulness, that camaraderie. That sense of, we’ve got a bit of power here, we’re all in agreement. And we feel like we know what we’re doing.’
But in the more than two years since the Panel had finished, the Council had not proactively communicated with ex-Panellists about whether they intended to implement the recommendations. Many concluded the Council had either forgotten about the report or chosen to ignore the recommendations. Indeed, evidence collected in stakeholder conversations suggested that limited progress had been made in substantially advancing the recommendations. Ex-panellists felt disillusioned, using words like ‘deflated’, ‘disappointed’, ‘sad’, ‘frustrated’, and ‘powerless’ to describe how their expectations had been raised and subsequently disappointed.
‘I think it’s how much hope we had. We’d done all done this, and we all felt … we can actually make a difference. We can actually do this. Looking back at it, none of it has happened. I feel like none of it’s happened. You know, we were all so hopeful.’
Some interviewees explained that, upon joining the jury, they felt mistrustful about whether it would lead to change. They had heard politicians make promises in the past, only to find that these were rarely followed through. They explained that they decided to take part anyway, in the hope that they might be proven wrong. In the aftermath of disappointment, their feelings of scepticism had been reinforced.
‘It kind of confirmed a lot of people’s scepticism. And I just think it, in areas now that these councillors and MPs will want [further community] engagement they’ve not encouraged that.’
Some indicated that disillusionment after the Panel reinforced a wider felt sense that political systems cannot be trusted to deliver significant change, including dealing with long-term issues like climate change. They explained that they want to see strong leadership to tackle the climate crisis but struggled to identify where political leadership might be found.
‘We’re all for leadership. We all agreed that without the leadership it can’t, it won’t, happen. … Everyone wants it, just no one knows how.’
The Copeland People’s Panel underscores the importance of clear communication with climate assembly participants and the need for a clear plan to incorporate findings prior to commissioning such a process. If the authority decides that it will not take forward some of the recommendations, then it needs to communicate proactively with jurors about why it has taken this decision. We are pleased that, following this case study’s findings, work is being undertaken by stakeholder organisations involved in commissioning the Panel to rectify the challenges identified above.
Unfortunately, the impact of climate assemblies on feelings of trust amongst wider publics has not been tested. The available evidence (Carrick & Elstub 2024) suggests that very few people are aware of even the larger national processes. Yet, lessons can be learnt from the wider literature where the capacity of such processes to increase trust amongst those who participate, and wider publics, has been demonstrated (Knobloch et al. 2019). Though this relationship is mediated by how legitimate people consider citizens’ assemblies to be, which in turn is mediated by such factors as people’s view on political representation; specific design features of assemblies; people’s attitudes towards existing political institutions; and, crucially, the topic being discussed (Gherghina & Geissel 2020; Goldberg & Bächtiger 2022).
The latter point in the above list is particularly pertinent to climate assemblies, given divergent views over the need for and shape of more ambitious climate policy. The scale of so-called ‘net-zero scepticism’ in the UK should not be exaggerated, as concern about climate and desire to see greater action is high and widespread (Ipsos & CAST 2022). However, there is a risk climate assemblies get wrapped up in these contested debates—and are dismissed as illegitimate by publics and policymakers alike. It is therefore important that climate assemblies are designed and presented in ways that do not exacerbate climate-specific cultural dividing lines. The wider SHAPE disciplines have a role here in understanding how those with different worldviews understand and respond to deliberative forums, and how such fora can be made more inclusive.
Oversight and accountability
The final objective of climate assemblies in net-zero governance considered here is to play an oversight and accountability role. Here, citizens act not in an authorship role to generate recommendations, but to hold to account leaders and public officials. Such holding to account can be ex ante by ensuring due process and adequacy of proposals, or ex post in ensuring effective delivery. Oversight assemblies could be structured similarly to traditional assemblies, in terms of size, recruitment methods, the hearing of evidence and expert witnesses, and deliberation over a conclusion.
As mentioned in Section 3, there have been some moves to experiment with using climate assemblies in an oversight function. These include the standing inquiry set up by the former Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee following Climate Assembly UK. More directly, the Scottish Parliament’s Net Zero, Energy and Transport Committee recently ran a climate assembly intended to review government action, rather than develop policy. The assembly ran in 2024 and was asked ‘How effective has the Scottish Government been at engaging the public on climate change and Scotland’s climate change targets?’ The findings are being used by the Committee to scrutinise the implementation of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act. This is a very recent process, and its effectiveness is therefore yet to be assessed.
Where next?—embedding deliberation in net-zero governance
Embedding citizens’ assemblies in governance institutions
In this final section we turn to the question of ‘where next?’ for citizen deliberation in net-zero governance. We first present a series of recommendations for improving the capacity of climate assemblies, as currently conceived, to deliver on the first three objectives discussed throughout this essay. Box 2 presents a case study where some of these recommendations have been put into practice, with a specific focus on the knowledge provision objective. We then suggest future areas for SHAPE research and experimentation that would expand the uses of deliberative and participatory processes in net zero governance.
Box 2
Case study: Embedding deliberative processes in the Climate Change Committee
In 2023/4, the UK Climate Change Committee (CCC) commissioned a deliberative process on the implications of net-zero policy options for households. The insights from this process will be used to inform the Committee’s seventh carbon budget advice to government. This initiative follows a period of learning and experimentation with deliberative methods at the CCC.
The CCC’s first engagement in deliberative methods came when then-CEO Chris Stark served as an expert lead for Climate Assembly UK. A CCC analyst gave a presentation to the assembly on the specific question of home energy decarbonisation. Following this, our team worked with the CCC to run a smaller deliberative process on the decarbonisation of owner-occupied homes. This ran in 2022, with participants designing a package of measures to enable homeowners to bring their houses into line with the UK’s net-zero 2050 target (Ainscough & Willis 2022). These measures, as well as the insights CCC analysts gained through the process, were used to inform a letter to the relevant minister, as well as the subsequent Progress Report.
These two processes were enough to convince the CCC of the utility of deliberative methods. As part of a wider internal restructuring, the CCC established a team whose remit included the commissioning of deliberative research. This team liaised with other analysts and the Committee to map out how deliberative research could be integrated into the organisation’s analytical approach. This led to a conclusion that they would be commissioned on an ad hoc basis, as the need arises: for example, where specific questions on public attitudes or perceptions cannot be answered through existing social science data. Evidence generated from these processes will feed into the CCC’s carbon budget advice development process.
Through the course of these processes, the CCC moved from being involved in ‘all climate processes’ to processes focused on specific policy challenges. It is clear how it will use these methods (as knowledge/information gathering tools) and has accordingly embedded them into its wider work processes. It has also invested in developing in-house expertise, allowing it to move from being a ‘partner’ in such processes, to commissioning them directly.
Recommendation 1: Design climate assemblies and their institutional linkages with a view to achieving specific objectives
Though the four objectives discussed throughout this paper are far from mutually exclusive, they do suggest some different design criteria (see Table 2). Commissioners and designers of climate assemblies should aim to be clear about their objectives from the outset and design processes accordingly.
Table 2
Suggested design criteria for climate assemblies oriented to each of the four objectives discussed in the paper.
| Objective | Evidence of success to date | Design considerations |
|---|---|---|
| Knowledge provision | Climate assemblies have proven effective in helping policymakers understand the potential reception and impacts of different policy options. | ∙ Commissioning bodies do not need to be empowered. Civil servants and government agencies can use assemblies as part of evidence gathering. ∙ Coupling with surveys and opinion polls can assist in building a detailed picture of public preferences. ∙ Expectations of participants and stakeholders need to be managed from the outset. |
| Mandate for action | Climate assemblies have been effective in giving confidence to policymakers already intending to bring forward climate policies. They have been less effective at compelling additional action to that already planned. | ∙ The commissioner should be the body empowered to act. ∙ The specific policy or initiative that the assembly is to feed into should be clear from the outset. ∙ The commissioner should make clear how they will use and respond to recommendations. |
| Increased trust | Climate assemblies have increased trust in institutions amongst those taking part, though this has diminished due to lack of follow-through. There has been limited impact on feelings of trust and political efficacy amongst the wider public. | ∙ Commissioners should make clear from the outset how proposals will be used and responded to. ∙ Commissioners should establish clear lines of communication with participants and wider publics/stakeholders, and provide regular updates on how proposals are being used. ∙ Governance structures should continue beyond the life of the assembly, to trace the use of proposals and hold commissioners accountable for commitments made. ∙ A communication strategy should be considered to engage the wider public in the process and findings. |
| Oversight and accountability | Climate assemblies have largely not been tested in an oversight and accountability function. | ∙ Could be instituted ‘upstream’ where policy decisions are made, or ‘downstream’ where decisions are enacted. ∙ Would require governance structures at least partially independent of the body being scrutinised. ∙ Could involve a ‘trigger mechanism’ where civil society groups or publics are able to trigger a deliberative process to evaluate decisions ex post. |
Recommendation 2: Move towards climate assemblies focused on specific aspects of the net-zero challenge
To ensure recommendations are practical and usable, it is important to consider the scope of the assembly and the question they are being asked. Many assemblies’ framing questions have been so broad that recommendations are necessarily relatively general. Future processes could generate more actionable recommendations by focusing on specific challenges, such as measures to reduce car usage or the specifics of retrofit financing schemes.
Recommendation 3: Consider diversity of political worldviews in the way that climate assemblies are designed and framed
As discussed in Section 2, there is some evidence that those with right-of-centre political views are self-excluding from participating in climate assemblies. Coxcoon (2024) suggests two design considerations that could address this issue. The first is to include political worldview as a screening criterion at the recruitment stage, to ensure proper representation. To develop this approach further, there is the option of moving away from demographic-based approaches to representation. Recruitment could instead ensure the representation of different discourses around the issue in question, or groups that are differently affected by the issue (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2024). The second, is to consider the framing and narrative surrounding climate assemblies. For example, presenting climate change as an issue of protecting nature can play better with right-of-centre citizens than presenting it as a social-justice issue.
Recommendation 4: Develop in-house expertise
Given the design considerations thus far discussed, the effective use of assemblies requires commissioning organisations to develop in-house expertise. This will ensure they are able to give clear instruction to the participation consultancy, thus ensuring processes match the requirements of the organisation. This would also help to ensure structures are in place to feed proposals into decision-making and follow-up on how they have been used.
Areas for future experimentation and research
To date, most climate assemblies have been used by local authorities or other state actors to feed into policy formulation. This far from exhausts the possible contributions of citizen participation in net-zero governance; it also leaves much of the power in the hands of existing institutions (Wells et al. 2021). In this final section, we consider other ways in which citizen bodies such as climate assemblies could be integrated into net-zero governance:
Oversight and accountability assemblies
As discussed, citizens could be asked to scrutinise state action. This could include the adequacy of policy in a specific area, such as the Scottish Parliament’s recent use, as discussed above. Such scrutiny could happen as part of the policy design process, prior to policy roll-out, rather than ex post as in the Scottish example. Assemblies or similar participatory processes could also be established to oversee the roll-out of a specific policy initiative and ensure policy commitments are being kept. For example, social housing tenants could be given regular opportunities to question those responsible for rolling out a retrofit scheme.
Participatory budgeting for climate
Citizens’ assemblies represent just one of a broader range of democratic innovations (Elstub & Escobar 2019). Another such innovation that has gained attention in other policy areas is participatory budgeting. Here, a public authority empowers a group of citizens to allocate earmarked funding. Participatory budgeting was pioneered in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 1989 in response to endemic corruption and clientelism. The process included a series of local town-hall meetings to raise awareness and discuss issues, before delegates from these were sent to a joint Council to allocate the available budget. This experiment, at least in its early years, was widely seen as successful at addressing socio-economic inequalities. Although, as the concept has spread, there have been criticisms about the very modest budgets sometimes offered for citizens to allocate (Jacquet et al. 2024a). There are relatively few examples in the UK of participatory budgeting being used in the context of net-zero governance, suggesting an avenue for future experimentation.
Civil-society-led climate assemblies
Most UK climate assemblies have been run by state institutions. This pattern is replicated across Europe, with over 140 climate assemblies organised by local authorities and eleven of the fourteen national-level assemblies having been commissioned by governments (KNOCA n.d.). There has also been a tendency amongst policymakers to see citizens’ assemblies as a data-gathering exercise, rather than the exercise in democratic empowerment that some advocates believe citizens’ assemblies should be. A consequence of this top-down approach is that much of the power, in terms of selecting participants, setting the framing, and enacting recommendations, remains with existing institutions. It is with this problem in mind that emergent civil-society-led climate assemblies hold potential (Extinction Rebellion 2020; Averchenkova 2024; Humanity Project n.d.). By being independent of government, such assemblies avoid the existing tendency of being reshaped or redirected so that they align with existing elite interests or preferences (Font et al. 2018; Johnson 2015). Given the urgency of the climate crisis, civil-society-led climate assemblies provide a valuable mechanism for deliberative democracy to retain its critical bite by making demands of, rather than recommendations to, the state.
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1
See Shepherd (2024) for the full list of framing questions.
2
See Shepherd (2024) for detailed methodology.
Cite
DOI: 10.5871/jba/013.a13
Published on: 20 February 2025
Volume: 13
Issue: Issue 1
Article view count: 1047
Article download count: 62
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© The author(s) 2025. This is an open access article licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International LicenseCite this article
Ainscough, J., Killen, L., Lewis, P., Shepherd, A. & Willis, R. (2025), ‘Citizen deliberation in Net Zero governance: learning lessons and looking forward’, Journal of the British Academy, 13(1): a13 https://doi.org/10.5871/jba/013.a13Crossref
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July 2023
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